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Abstract
The yablo Paradox’ main interest lies on its prima facie non-circular character, which
many have doubted, specially when formulated in an extension of the language of first-
order arithmetic. Particularly, Priest (1997) and Cook (2006, forthcoming) provided
contentious arguments in favor of circularity. my aims in this note are (i) to show that
the notion of circularity involved in the debate so far is defective, (ii) to provide a new
sound and useful partial notion of circularity and (iii) to show there is a non-circular
formulation of the list in an extension of the language of first-order arithmetic
according to the new notion.
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Resumen
el interés principal de la Paradoja de yablo yace en su carácter prima facie no circular,
el cual ha sido puesto en duda especialmente con respecto a la formulación de la
paradoja en una extensión del lenguaje de la aritmética de primer orden.
Particularmente, Priest (1997) y Cook (2006, en prensa) formularon argumentos
contenciosos a favor de la circularidad. los objetivos de esta nota son (i) señalar que
la noción de circularidad utilizada hasta el momento en el debate es defectuosa, (ii)
ofrecer una nueva noción parcial adecuada y útil de circularidad y (iii) mostrar que existe
una formulación no circular de la lista en una extensión del lenguaje de la aritmética
de primer orden de acuerdo con la nueva noción.
PalaBraS Clave: Paradoja de yablo; lenguajes de primer orden; Circularidad;
Trivialidad; Punto fijo.
as is well known, the yablo Paradox’ main interest lies on its prima
facie non-circular character, which many have doubted, specially when
formulating the list in first-order arithmetical systems.1 Particularly,
Priest (1997) and Cook (2006, forthcoming) provided contentious
arguments in favor of circularity. my aim in this note is to show there is
a non-circular formulation of the list in a first-order arithmetical
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1 By ‘arithmetical system’ or ‘arithmetical theory’ i will understand any classical
extension of Pa or Pa itself.
language.2 in section 1 i show different ways of formalizing the yablo
sequence within such languages. in 2, i first examine Priest’s position and
make some critical comments, and then analyze Cook’s claims and
argue that the notion of circularity he embraces is built on the wrong bases
and, therefore, fails to capture the most simple intuitions. Section 3 is
devoted to provide more accurate bases on which better criteria can rest,
develop such a criterion and show its advantages. finally, in 4 i conclude
there is a first-order formulation of the yablo sequence that is not circular
according to the proposed criterion and ponder the value of this result.
1. Formalizing the Yablo list
as Cook (2006, forthcoming) notices, there are at least two
traditional ways of allowing first-order formulae to refer to each other:
by means of identity statements and by means of biconditionals. in the
case of the liar Sentence, for instance, the first alternative gives us the
formula ‘λ = <¬Tλ>’,3 stating that λ is the name of the sentence that says
of itself that it is untrue, which Cook calls ‘old-fashioned liar’; while the
second leads to ‘λ ↔ ¬T<λ>’, according to which λ is a formula merely
equivalent to the statement that it is itself untrue. This biconditional
expression is known as the ‘arithmetic liar’. The yablo sentences can be
formalized within arithmetical languages by both means as well. To
guarantee the existence of the arithmetic yablo sequence:
(yay) {y(n) ↔ ∀y(y > n → ¬T<y(dot(y))>) : n ∈ ω}4
we may add a new monadic predicate symbol y to lT, the language that
obtains by adding to lPa the monadic predicate symbol T for truth, and
formulate each biconditional in the sequence; or we could just apply a
generalization of the Diagonalization lemma to the lT formula ‘∀y(y >
x → ¬Tz(dot(y)/<x>))’,5 obtaining the ufPyPy:
(ufPyPy) y(x) ↔ ∀y(y > x → ¬T<y(dot(y))>)
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2 By ‘arithmetical language’ i will understand any classical extension of LPa, the
language of Pa, or LPa itself.
3 for any formula φ of a first-order language, <φ> denotes φ, possibly via Gödel coding.
4 i am using the same symbol for numbers and numerals in order to simplify
formulae.
5 The tryadic function symbol x(y/z) represents the primitive recursive function that,
applied to the codes x, y, and z of a formula φ, a term t and a variable v, respectively,
gives the code of the formula that obtains by replacing v in φ with t.
and then derive the set of yablo biconditionals from it by replacing x for
each numeral in the language. Hence, the arithmetic yablo can be
constructed in lT. on the contrary, to guarantee the existence of the old-
fashioned yablo sequence, the addition of a new monadic predicate name
S to the language is needed. By stipulation, one could define S as
follows:
(ufPyPS) S = <∀y(y > x → ¬TS(dot(y)/<x>))>
again, the yablo sequence is obtained by instantiating the free
variable x with each numeral.6 However, one can directly stipulate the
list, instead of this general principle and get:
(yaS) {S(dot(n)/<x>) = <∀y(y > n → ¬TS(dot(y)/<x>))> : n ∈ ω}
2. Priest’s claims and Cook’s interpretation
Priest (1997) considers both ways of formalizing the list and
focuses on the formal versions of step marked (**) in the introduction to
this symposium. as he claims, there are two ways of reading it. first, n
could be naturally seen as a variable, to which universal generalization
is applied right away. However, in that case, the first part of the reductio
must be carried over turning, not just to biconditionals or identity
statements in the list, but also to the more general corresponding
principles: ufPyPy and ufPyPS, which, of course, are not entailed by
the lists themselves. Priest claims these are both circular formulae, for
they provide definitions for y and S in terms of themselves: while the
ufPyPy states that y(x) is a weak fixed point of the formula ‘∀y(y > z
→ ¬Tz(dot(y)/<x>))’ —for it just establishes equivalence, but not identity—
the ufPyPS states that S is a strong fixed point of ‘<∀y(y > x →
¬Tz(dot(y)/<x>))>(z/<z>)’. But neither of these principles is merely
arithmetical, merely truth-theoretical, or merely arithmetical and truth-
theoretical. Thus, they must belong to the core of their corresponding
paradoxes. Since its reasonable to call a paradox circular whenever
constituted by circular expressions, Priest concludes that the antinomies
obtained this way are circular.
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6 actually, a little move is needed to obtain the yablo identity statements from the
ufPyPS: since S = <∀y(y > x → ¬TS(dot(y)))>, we can get S(dot(x)/<x>) = <∀y(y > x →
¬TS(dot(y)))>(dot(x)/<x>) and then instantiate x with each numeral.
But, secondly, n could also be seen as schematic, standing for any
natural number. from this point of view, yablo’s reasoning would not
require the ufPyP in any of its versions, but just the numerical
instances, though an infinite number of subproofs would be needed, one
for each n, and then an application of the ω-rule, which Priest dismisses
for non-logical reasons. notwithstanding, Priest asserts that, even if yablo
actually applied this rule and not the ufPyP, circularity is still present
in the original structure of his construction, for it involves a predicate,
y or S, whose instances of application are all defined in terms of (other
instances of) itself and, therefore, are ungrounded. according to Priest,
y and S are still fixed points of the corresponding formulae mentioned
above.
even if we concede Priest that both ufPyPs are circular for stating
that y and S are fixed points of other predicates, his reasons do not suffice
to do so with the sets of their corresponding numerical instances,yay and
yaS. first, while, as Priest claims, each member of these sets is defined
in terms of y and S, respectively, and this implies that both yay and yaS
are intuitively ungrounded, that should not be enough for circularity, since
we could add a new term c to the language, the formulae ‘c > n’ for each
n ∈ ω to the two of them and the sentences ‘y(c)’ and ‘S(dot(c)/<x>) = 0’
to each of them, respectively, grounding both and, thus, making the so-
called circularity disappear. Since circularity should not vanish by
adding new elements, it is not reasonable to claim that it was present
before. Second, despite Priest’s assertions, if we just consider members
of yay or yaS, it is not clear that y and S are still fixed points of the same
predicates respectively. in order to make that claim the corresponding
ufPyP is needed, and its mere numerical instances do not entail it by
themselves. as far as it goes, if we reject both ufPyPs and stick to yay
or yaS there is prima facie no reason to claim circularity is involved,
though contradiction will not arise in a first-order system.
according to Cook (forthcoming, p. 98), the reasons that allow
Priest to claim that the arithmetic yablo is circular with or without the
ufPyPy are that:
[…] the construction involves some sort of expression that turns out
to be equivalent to a second expression that ‘says’ something about the
first (or its Gödel code). Whether or not this expression is one of the
statements involved in the paradox or a sub-sentential component of
such statements would seem to be irrelevant. This, i take it, is the
substantial (and correct!) core of Priest’s argument in his (1997).
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Cook sticks to Priest’s alleged criterion whereby an expression is
circular if it involves a formula that is a weak fixed point of some
predicate. But then notices that in every first-order language containing
names for its expressions any formula is a weak fixed point of some other.
Thus, he concludes, each sentence of a first-order arithmetical language
is circular in this sense, thereby rejecting any possibility of having a non-
circular expression, paradoxical or not, within them, including the old-
fashioned yablo in any of its versions. This forces him to embrace
infinitary languages to get what he believes is a genuine non-circular
antinomy. finally, he claims that is the sort of circularity present both
in the arithmetic liar and in the arithmetic yablo and, hence, neither
it has explanatory power, nor is the root cause of paradoxicality, as it is
involved in all formulae.
3. A new criterion
The criterion for circularity in first-order languages adopted by
Cook (forthcoming) is visibly unsound. in the first place, it trivializes the
notion of circularity for, as Cook claims, according to it all sentences
become circular. moreover, if the criterion were conceptually accurate, it
could pass on to sentences in the natural language, where any declarative
sentence a of english is a weak fixed point of the predicate “‘x’ is
identical to ‘x’, and a”: a is logically equivalent to “‘a’ is identical to ‘a’,
and a”.7 Hence, every statement of english would be circular as well,
which is obviously not the case.
nonetheless, it is not the criterion itself that should be blamed for
trivialization but a more basic notion involved in it, a notion of reference
according to which, given two first-order formulae φ and ψ, φ refers to
ψ if φ is equivalent to another expression containing <ψ>. Despite the
wide acceptance this notion of reference has among specialists (excluding
Cook) —particularly when it comes to the arithmetic liar and the
Gödel sentence— it is not a materially adequate condition for reference,
for even interpreting equivalence with the most weak notion, i.e., logical
equivalence, it turns out that every expression refers to each other. To
see it, the trick from last paragraph could be mimicked in any first-order
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7 it could be argued that classical logic is not english’s logic, or even that english has
no logic at all. in the first case, a few modifications in a’s classically equivalent
statement could be introduced to preserve the equivalence even within other logical
systems. in the second case, it is hard to see how a notion of circularity could be applied
to declarative sentences of english then.
language but, moreover, propositional logic suffices: any first-order
formula φ is logically equivalent to ‘φ ∧ (<ψ> = <ψ> ∨ <ψ> ≠ <ψ>)’. Hence,
the notion of reference on which Cook’s criterion lies already entails
triviality and must therefore by rejected as base notion for any criterion
(and i guess Cook himself would be happy to do so).
as a consequence, i suggest we should look for a new analysis of
reference. old-fashioned formulations come up naturally for this task,
since it seems reasonable to assert that, given two first-order formulae
φ and ψ, φ refers to ψ if φ itself contains <ψ> and once an identity
statement has been established, we are not allowed to add other
expressions to the right of the identity symbol, being at risk for triviality
as we were when equivalence was involved.
There is at least another intuitive notion of reference between first-
order expressions in the literature, according to which formulae refer to each
other if they (or equivalent formula) quantify over them. for instance, in
lT ‘∀x(x = x)’ refers to every formula, including itself, but ‘∀x(Tx → Px)’
refers only to true sentences. of course, a notion of circularity could (and
should) be built on this relation, as leitgeb (2002) does. However, it is not
the kind of circularity we are analyzing here, for yablo’s sentences seem
to avoid it by quantifying just over the ones below them in the sequence,
or at least both Priest (1997) and Cook (2006) concede this point.8 The notion
of reference i provide next, and the corresponding criterion for circularity
i introduce, only concern mentioning and say nothing about achieving
reference or circularity by quantification or other means. Thus, i will use
‘m-reference’ and ‘m-circularity’, respectively. naturally, m-reference and
m-circularity entail, correspondingly, reference and circularity simpliciter,
but not the other way around.
our preliminary way of defining reference suits perfectly for
sentences such as ‘τ = <Tτ>’, an old-fashioned version of the Truth-Teller,
for it entails that τ is self-referential. However, it only accounts for cases
of direct reference as this one, leaving aside reference cycles such as the
one given by the sentences ‘τ1 = <Tτ2>’ and ‘τ2 = <Tτ1>’, where τ1 refers
to itself indirectly. Thus, if φ and ψ are formulae of a first-order
language:9
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8 for specific quotes, see Priest (1997, p. 237) and Cook (forthcoming, pp. 72-73).
Some objections had been raised by alberto moretti (private conversation), since the
nth yablo statement quantifies over sentences whose code is grater than n, and that
may include it. leitgeb (2002) has reformulated yablo’s list to avoid this. Thus, if the
reader finds the objection compelling, she could reproduce leitgeb’s trick without
changing the main facts of the paper.
9 Both following definitions belong to leitgeb (2002, pp. 4-5).
DEFINITION 1: φ directly m-refers to ψ if and only if φ contains a
singular term t and t = <ψ>.
DEFINITION 2: φ m-refers to ψ if and only if the ordered pair <φ, ψ>
belongs to the transitive closure of direct m-reference.
Thus, while τ both directly and indirectly refers to itself, τ1 and τ2
refer to themselves only indirectly, and this is intuitively sound. now we
are in a position to introduce a new criterion for circularity founded on our
new notion of m-reference. following the intuition —shared apparently
Cook’s (forthcoming) own criterion and by many others— that any
formula of a first-order theory is circular if it contains an expression that
‘says’ something about, or refers to, itself, given any two formulae φ and
ψ of the language of a first-order system Th:
DEFINITION 3: φ is m-circular if and only if it contains a singular term
t such that t = <ψ> and ψ m-refers to ψ according to
φ and Th.10
according to this criterion, it is easy to notice that ‘τ = <Tτ>’ comes
out circular, but also does, for instance, ‘¬Tτ1‘ if both ‘τ1 = <Tτ2>’ and ‘τ2
= <Tτ1>’ are entailed by the background theory, since it contains τ1, the
theory implies that ‘τ1 = <Tτ2>’ and, as we have already mentioned, ‘Tτ2‘
refers to itself.
Definition 3 only applies to single formulae. However, since we are
concerned mainly with the circular or non-circular character of the
yablo sequence, we are also interested in evaluating the possibly circular
character of sets of expressions. let Γ be a set of formulae of the
language of a first-order system Th:
DEFINITION 4: Γ is m-circular if and only if one of its members
contains a singular term t such that t = <ψ> and ψ m-
refers to ψ according to Γ and Th.
Thus, if we follow definition 4, {τ1 = <Tτ2>, τ2 = <Tτ1>} turns out
to be trivially circular but also {τ1 = <Tτ2>, τ2 = <Tτ3>} if the background
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10 in a previous version of this note—the one originally sent to Cook—i had defined
m-circularity as containing a singular term t such that t = <ψ> and ψm-refers to itself.
as Cook (in this volume) correctly points out, this definition is unsound. Shortly after
writing this note but before getting Cook's comments i noticed my mistake and fixed
it precisely in the direction Cook suggests in his Definition 3.5.
theory entails that τ3 = <Tτ1>. allowing the background theory (including
logic) to play a role in these criteria does not make them trivial. in fact,
identities involving names are not logical truths, but stipulations of one
system or another. also, implication within the background theory is
restricted to reference patterns, and it must be, contrary to leitgeb’s
(2002) claim. if some background theory entails m-circular formulae and
we allowed expressions to be m-circular whenever they imply formulae
that turn out to be circular according to definition 3, every such expression
would be m-circular too. for take a term t denoting an m-circular
expression ψ within Th (t = <ψ> and ψ refers to itself according to Th);
then, any formula entails ‘t = t’ by logic alone and, thus, it would be
circular. intuitively, circularity should emerge from the expression or set
of expressions called circular, and not just form logic or background
theories.
as we have seen, the new criterion provides the right answer for
paradigmatic cases as the old-fashioned liar, the old-fashioned Truth-
Teller and any of their cycles. at the same time, it does not regard every
expression as m-circular, since, for instance, ‘0 = 0’ does not contain a term
that denotes a self-referential formula. it might be the case that m-
circularity is neither sufficient nor necessary for paradox, but being not
as vacuous as Cook’s suggested notion, it could have prima facie an
explanatory role in paradoxicality.
4. What about Yablo?
The aim of this paper is to show there is a formulation of the yablo
list that is not circular, at best in the sense of ‘circular’ we are concerned
with. of course, given that the new criterion seems sound, it will serve
as tool for evaluating different formulations. However, let us begin by
noticing that the set of formulae that has been called ‘arithmetic yablo’
does not provide a satisfactory formulation of yablo’s original sequence.
for while in the last one sentences refer to each other, the arithmetic
yablo does not entail reference of any kind, since reference cannot be
achieved by mere equivalence. 
Thus, we are left only with the two mentioned ways of getting the
old-fashioned yablo: by the ufPyPS and just by the set of its instances,
yaS. if, following Priest’s (1997) first path, one believes that yablo’s
informal reasoning applies the ufPyPS, this principle belongs to the core
of the paradox we obtain, as established in section 2. Since the ufPyPS
contains a term, S, such that ufPyPS Ⱶ S = <∀y(y > x → ¬TS(dot(y)/<x>))>
and ‘∀y(y > x → ¬TS(dot(y)/<x>))’ m-refers to ‘∀y(y > x → ¬TS(dot(y)/<x>))’
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according to the ufPyPS, the paradox is circular: we agree with Priest.
However, if we believe that is not yablo’s move, therefore excluding the
ufPyPS and limiting ourselves just to identity statements in the
sequence, we do not get a paradox, but the set we are considering, namely,
yaS, is not circular according to our criterion, for non of its members
establishes an identity between a term and a formula that mentions it
but always expressions below it:11 the cycle never closes, we disagree with
Priest.
Consequently, contrary to Cook’s claim, it seems possible to have
non-circular expressions in first-order languages, and it also seems
possible to have a formulation of the yablo list among them. This result
may appear to be sterile, since that formulation does not entail a
contradiction along with reasonable arithmetic and truth-theoretical
principles, but it is not entirely such. Both Cook’s criterion and ours extend
naturally to second-order languages, with similar consequences,
respectively. if we add the yablo identity statements to (full) second-order
arithmetic, Pa2, along with the uniform T-Schema for such sentences we
get an unsatisfiable —though consistent— system.12 Thus, if we consider
the impossibility of assigning stable truth values to expressions in the list
—witnessed by the lack of (full) models— is enough for paradox, it would
not be necessary, as Cook claims, to appeal to infinitary languages to have
a non-circular antinomy.
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12 See Picollo (2012) for formal proofs, though they must be adapted to the old-
fashioned formulation of the list.
